We study a newsvendor game with transshipments, in which n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product. Before the demand is realized, each retailer independently orders her initial inventory. After the demand is realized, the retailers select an optimal transshipment pattern and ship residual inventories in order to meet residual demands. Unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period. We compare two methods for distribution of residual profit -transshipment prices (TP) and dual allocations (DA) -that were previously analyzed in literature. Transshipment prices are selected a priori, before the demand is known, while dual allocations, which are obtained by calculating the dual prices for the transshipment problem, are calculated ex post, after observing the true demand. We first study the conditions for the existence of the Nash equilibria under DA, and then compare the performance of the two methods and show that neither allocation method dominates the other. Our analysis suggests that DA may yield higher efficiency among "more asymmetric" retailers, while TP works better with retailers who are "more alike", but the difference in profits does not seem significant.
Introduction
In their recent papers, Rudi et al. (RKP, 2001) , Anupindi et al. (ABZ, 2001 ), Granot and Sošić (G&S, 2003) , and Hu et al. (HDK, 2007) develop and study models in which n independent retailers face stochastic demands for identical products (we also refer readers to their papers for a review of related literature, which we omit for brevity). Before demand realization, retailers unilaterally determine their stocking quantities. After the demand is realized and the retailers fulfill their own needs with inventories on hand, they may be left with unsatisfied demand or leftover supply (which we call residuals). The retailers at this point cooperatively determine a pattern for distribution of residual inventories, and divide the profit from transshipments (which we call residual profit) according to an allocation rule specified at the beginning of the game.
Different allocation rules have different impacts on the stocking quantities, on the residuals shared, and on the profit levels. RKP and HDK analyze a model in which the residual profit is allocated among the retailers according to a priori determined prices for each unit shipped from one retailer to the other, and limit their analysis to the case with two retailers. They develop the expressions for a priori transshipment prices (TP) and investigate conditions under which a first-best outcome can be achieved. ABZ, on the other hand, propose an ex-post allocation rule based on the dual prices for the transshipment problem, which we call dual allocations (DA), for an arbitrary number of retailers. DA possess some nice properties that make them attractivethey are easy to calculate, and they belong to the core of the corresponding game, so no subset of players has an incentive to defect and act on their own. Despite this, we are not aware of many instances in which they are implemented in practice (for an exception, see Pratt et al. 1997 ).
In our analysis, we follow the assumptions from ABZ and assume that the retailers share all of their residuals (which we refer to as complete sharing) after their local demand is satisfied. If complete sharing is not implicitly assumed, G&S show that DA may induce the retailers to increase their allocations by withholding some residuals, which, in turn, may reduce the residual profit. Note that this result holds in the one-shot setting. However, it is likely that, in real life, cooperating retailers interact repeatedly over time. Huang and Sošić (2008) show that in a repeated setting, in which each retailer faces her demand over several periods, the retailers using DA share all of their residuals in an equilibrium whenever the discount factor is large enough (that is, the retailers put enough weight on future payoffs), hence we assume complete sharing throughout the paper.
In their results, ABZ assume that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcome in order quantities exists. As we show in this paper, profit functions under DA do not, in general, exhibit continuity and unimodality, which makes showing the existence of the NE a nontrivial task. Thus, in this paper we first analyze conditions for the existence of the NE in both pure and mixed strategies.
While the existence of the NE in pure strategies requires some rather strong assumptions, the existence of the mixed strategy NE is easily shown for a rather general case.
We then compare DA and TP used in RKP and HDK. We show that there are instances in which DA coordinate the system while the TP do not, and vice versa. We also identify some conditions for parameter values over which one method outperforms the other when neither induces a first-best outcome. Our analysis indicates that the system is more likely to prefer TP when the retailers differ only in retail prices, while DA may be a better option when the retailers differ only in their costs. In addition, we note that DA may yield higher profits when the retailers are in general "more asymmetric". Overall, neither of the two methods dominates the other, and each may be preferred under a particular set of parameter values. At the same time, our numerical results suggest that the difference in profits obtained by using these two allocation methods is not very significant.
However, we note that DA are easier to extend to the case with arbitrarily many retailers. In a later section, we propose several heuristics for TP in settings with more than two retailers.
We also link the expected dual prices to TP when n = 2, and use this relationship to develop some heuristics for TP with a larger number of symmetric retailers. We analyze the performance of these heuristics as functions of the number of retailers and the critical fractile. For general instances with more than two asymmetric retailers, we propose a TP agreement which uses a neutral central depot to coordinate the transshipments (TPND). While our numerical simulations suggest that DA in general outperform TPND, its ease of implementation makes TPND an attractive alternative to DA when the efficiency losses are not significant (e.g., high critical fractiles or low demand variances).
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. Establishing conditions for the existence of the NE in inventory-sharing games with dual allocations -in previous literature, this existence has been assumed, but not proven; 2. Comparison of the performance of transshipment prices and dual allocations -our analysis indicates that the profit difference between the two allocation methods is not very significant; 3. Developing heuristics for transshipment prices in models with more than two retailers -to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to develop such heuristics.
The structure of the paper is as follows: we briefly introduce the general inventory-sharing game in §2. In §3, we analyze inventory-sharing game with DA and discuss the conditions for the existence of the NE. We present the game with TP in §4, while in §5 we compare the performance of the two allocation methods and link TP and expected dual prices. In §6, we develop heuristics for TP with an arbitrary number of retailers, by considering separately models with symmetric and asymmetric retailers. We conclude in §7. The proofs are given in a technical appendix.
Inventory-Sharing Game
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a set of retailers who are selling an identical product and are facing independent random demands, D i . Each retailer knows the distribution of her demand, F i , and its density, f i . We assume in our analysis that demand densities are logconcave. In addition, we assume that there are no capacity constraints and that the game begins with zero inventory.
Before demand D i is realized, each retailer makes her order decision, X i , contingent upon the demand distribution and the allocation rule used to distribute the additional profit. After demand is realized and each retailer satisfies her needs from inventory on hand, the shipping pattern for leftover inventory that maximizes the residual profit is determined. The resulting residual profit is then distributed among the retailers according to the predetermined allocation rule. Any inventory left at the retailers is salvaged.
More formally, we denote by r i , c i , and v i , r i > c i > v i , the unit retail price, cost, and salvage price for retailer i, respectively. LetH i = max{X i − D i , 0} andĒ i = max{D i − X i , 0} denote the total leftover inventory and unsatisfied demand for retailer i, respectively. Y ij denotes amount of stock shipped from i to j, and t ij denotes the corresponding unit cost of transportation. Bold letters are used to denote vectors and matrices. To avoid trivial situations (that is, to assure that only the residuals are pooled, and it is done only when they are used to fill the excess demand), it is commonly assumed that r j ≥ r i − t ji , c j ≥ c i − t ji , and v j ≥ v i − t ji . We also assume that r i − t ji − v j ≥ 0; otherwise, no inventory will be shipped from j to i.
The transshipment pattern, given demand realizations, can be solved through linear programming. LetR(X, D) denote the residual profit, andR(X) its expected value; the optimal shipping pattern, Y, can be determined by solvingR * (X, D) := max
where p ij = r j − v i − t ij . The profit for a retailer, i, can be written as
where ϕ A i (X, D) denotes the share of the residual profit assigned to retailer i under allocation rule A. The first-stage NE order decisions, X A , must satisfy
We also mention, as benchmarks, two related models -the non-cooperative game and the centralized model. If there is no cooperation among the retailers (that is, the retailers do not share their residuals), each retailer's profit can be described as
. Superscript 1 denotes the non-cooperative model in which each retailer acts individually. The optimal order decision, X 1 i , corresponds to the newsvendor solution.
In the centralized model, in which a single decision maker optimizes the profit of the entire system, the total system profit can be written as
with the expectation J n (X) = E[P n (X, D)]. Superscript n denotes that n retailers participate in inventory sharing. Concavity of J n (X) follows from the result in Bradley et al. (1977) , which states that the optimal value of a linear program is a concave polyhedral function of its righthand-side vector. The optimal order amount for this model, X n , is referred to as a first-best solution.
Dual Allocations
Anupindi et al. (ABZ, 2001) assume that the retailers chose the dual allocation rule, which is based on the dual solution of the LP problem used to determine the optimal shipping pattern for residuals:
where λ i and µ i are the dual prices corresponding to the constraints (1a) and (1b), respectively.
Thus, this allocation rule determines the prices ex post, after demand realizations are known.
Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.1 in ABZ (2001) use results from Karlin (1968) and provide conditions for the existence of the pure strategy NE in order quantities, X A , for an arbitrary allocation rule. Namely, it is enough to check that:
1. the profit function for each retailer is continuous in order quantities, 2. the demand densities belong to the class of Polya Frequency Functions of order 2 (PF2) (e.g., gamma distribution, uniform distribution, and a truncated normal distribution), 3. for any demand realization, the profit function is unimodal in X i for every X −i .
The condition PF2 is equivalent to the requirement that the demand distributions have logconcave densities (that is, for a density function f , log f is concave). Note that ABZ assume in their analysis that the conditions for the existence of the NE are satisfied; we analyze these conditions further in Sections 3.1 -3.3.
Unimodality
First, it can be verified that in the model with only two players and under DA, the profit function is always unimodal in X i . Suppose, for instance, thatĒ j > 0, and recall that p ij = r j − v i − t ij .
Then,
Thus, the profit function is increasing in X i until X i − D i becomes greater thanĒ j , when it starts decreasing. Note that when n = 2 dual prices are either 0 or p ij ; with n > 2, the situation is not that straightforward. Suppose, for instance, that j =iĒ j > j =iH j . Then,
The value of λ i depends on the relationship between total residual supply and demand. In order to analyze retailers' profits, we need the following result.
Lemma 1. λ i is decreasing in X i , while µ i is increasing with X i .
Thus, once X i becomes larger than D i , both
in X i , with λ i = 0 when X i becomes large enough. If all retailers face equal costs and prices (p ij = p, ∀i, j), then the model has characteristics of the two-retailer problem -the profit functions have discontinuity only at the point jĒ j = jH j , and the profit functions are unimodal. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . 
However, if the costs/prices vary at different retailers, we can have multiple "jumps" in the profit function, and unimodality does not necessarily hold. Before we proceed with the analysis, we introduce the following result.
Lemma 2. Given a retailer, i, let
It follows from Lemma 2 that, if p ij ≤ c i − v i for all retailers j, then i's profit after the change in the value of λ i is decreasing, and we again have unimodality. This is illustrated in graph (a) of Figure 2 . Unfortunately, if p ij > c i −v i , i's profit may be increasing after the change in λ i , hence it is not unimodal (see graph (b) of Figure 2 ). Similar analysis can be conducted for j =iĒ j < j =iH j
Figure 2: Profit function for retailer i when n = 6, D i = 10, j =iĒ j − j =iH j = 18, as a function of X i :
by looking at the relationship between p ji and r i − c i . We address this in our next result.
Lemma 3. Given demand realizations, the profit functions for individual retailers are unimodal under DA when
Lemma 3 is used to show unimodality of the expected profit functions. Our proof uses the approach similar to that in Theorem 1.10 in Dharmadhikari and Joag-dev (1988) .
Proposition 1. If the demand density functions are logconcave, then the expected profit functions under DA are unimodal in X i for every X −i whenever p ij = p for all i = j, or p ij ≤ min{c i − v i , r j − c j } for all i = j.
Continuity
As noted earlier (see, for instance, Figures 1 and 2 ), the profit functions under DA are not continuous. Another concept of continuity often used in NE analysis is that of upper semicontinuity, which requires that for any sequence x n such that x n → x, we have lim sup n→∞ f i (x n ) ≤ f i (x). Note that our definition of the profit function P d i is not complete, as we have not specified how the profit is allocated in the degenerate case in which multiple dual solutions exist. However, regardless of our choice of the dual price vector, the resulting profit function will not be upper semicontinuous.
Proposition 2. Given demand realizations, the profit functions for individual retailers are not upper semicontinuous under DA.
The Existence of the Nash Equilibrium under Dual Allocations
Although we have conditions for unimodality, our game does not exhibit upper semicontinuity and we are unable to apply directly the results for the existence of the NE in pure strategies from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) (we discuss the existence of the NE in mixed strategies later).
However, when the profit functions are unimodal, we can obtain conditions for the existence of NE by using the result from Reny (1999) . Theorem 1. If the demand density functions in inventory-sharing game with DA are logconcave, the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists whenever (i) n = 2, or (ii) n > 2 and p ij = p for all
The conditions given in Theorem 1 are sufficient, but not necessary. Thus, there are instances in which these conditions do not hold, but the NE does exist. In addition, the conditions from Theorem 1 are rather restrictive and may not hold in many real-life situations, and we next investigate conditions for the existence of the mixed strategy NE. Here, we can use the results from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and show the existence under more general conditions. Theorem 2. If the demand density functions in inventory-sharing game with DA are logconcave, the Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists.
Achieving a First-Best Solution
The maximum system profit is not achieved unless the retailers order the amount optimal for the centralized model, X n . Thus, DA may, in general, result in inefficiencies. We next analyze the conditions under which decentralized stocking quantities under DA, X d , may coincide with the centralized ones, X n . It follows from (2) and (3) that the expected profit for retailer i is given by
hence the total expected profit for the system of retailers under DA is
Our first result shows that the system may be coordinated when the retailers are symmetric.
Proposition 3. If n retailers in the inventory-sharing game are symmetric, a first-best solution can be achieved through DA.
Proposition 3 says that it is sufficient to have symmetric retailers to achieve a first-best outcome.
This condition may be satisfied if, for instance, all retailers belong to the same organization, hence they face the same costs/prices, and cover similar territories. However, in many realistic cases, this condition may not hold. Thus, we want to find more general conditions under which a first-best outcome can be achieved.
The optimal order strategy for the centralized model, X n , satisfies the following first-order conditions (see (6)):
while (5) implies that the optimal order of an individual retailer in the decentralized system under DA, X d i , satisfies
( 7) and (8) give us a sufficient and necessary condition for a retailer in the decentralized system with an arbitrary number of retailers to order a system-optimal quantity.
Theorem 3. In an inventory-sharing game with n retailers in which J n (X) is unimodal in X, a first-best solution can be induced with DA when
For example, when n = 3, one can evaluate that the retailers with D i ∼ U [0, 100]; i = 1, 2, 3; p 12 = p 23 = p 31 = 6; and p 21 = p 32 = p 13 = 8 satisfy the above condition, and a first-best outcome can be achieved.
Complete Sharing of Residuals
In our analysis of DA so far, we have followed the model of ABZ (2001), which implicitly assumes that the retailers share all of their residuals after they satisfy their own demand. Granot and Sošić (G&S, 2003) develop a model in which complete sharing is not implicitly assumed: after demand is realized and each retailer satisfies her needs from inventory on hand, she decides how much of her residuals to share with others. G&S show that DA may induce the retailers to increase their allocations by withholding some residuals, which, in turn, may reduce the residual profit. Thus, in a one-shot setting, we need some additional enforcement mechanisms if we want to induce complete sharing of residuals (which is assumed in our analysis so far). Huang and Sošić (2008) show that such a mechanisms is not necessary if the game is repeated infinitely many times and the retailers do not discount their future payoffs too much. Thus, when the retailers are engaged in repeated interactions and the future payoffs are not overly discounted, we can freely use the assumption that the retailers share all of their residuals and apply the analysis from previous sections. As a result, we continue to assume complete sharing of residuales in the reminder of the paper.
Transshipment Prices (TP) when n = 2
RKP and HDK analyzed a decentralized model with two retailers, in which the residual profit is allocated among the retailers according to the a priori determined prices, τ ij , for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, that retailer i charges retailer j for every unit shipped from i to j, so that
HDK show that each retailer's expect profit is a unimodal function. If we denote
then the first-order conditions (FOC) for the model with TP can be written as
The system can be coordinated if τ ij are given by
where probabilities are evaluated at X i = X n i , if and only if
Note that when demands are continuous random variables, equations (10) are equivalent to
We will use these relationships in the next section.
Dual Allocations vs. Transshipment Prices when n = 2
We now explore the relationship between TP and DA when n = 2. Recall that the expected profit function under dual allocations, J d i , is unimodal with only two retailers. We first consider the conditions for achieving a first-best outcome under the two allocation methods, and then compare the performance of the allocation methods when the system cannot be coordinated.
Achieving a first-best outcome
and let a i (X 1 , X 2 ) and b i (X 1 , X 2 ) be defined by (10). The FOC for the centralized system are given by
We first consider DA; with only two retailers, dual prices are either 0 or p ij (λ i = p ij when E j >H i > 0, and µ i = p ji whenH j >Ē i > 0), and we can verify that the expected allocation to retailer i can be expressed as
If we denote
then the FOC under DA are given by
, we can easily verify that DA can coordinate the system if and only if
.
Next, we consider TP. If we denote
it follows from (14) that X n satisfies
Because r i − v i > 0, it is easy to verify that coordinating TP exist (i.e., (12) holds) if and only if
If we define
and (15) is satisfied, then, as shown in the proof of Theorem 1 in HKD, the coordinating prices are
given by τ ij = p ij γ j + v i + t ij , hence (9) implies that retailer i receives p ij γ j for every unit shipped from i to j, and p ji (1 − γ i ) for every unit shipped from j to i. Thus, the condition under which coordinating TP exist, inequalities (12), correspond to results in Theorem 3.2 from ABZ (1999).
Comparison of the allocation methods
After providing conditions under which each of the two allocation methods can achieve a first-best outcome, we next compare their performance. First, we show that neither of the two methods dominates the other one in terms of achieving system-optimal solutions. We then compare the performance of the two methods when system-coordinating outcomes cannot be induced.
Comparison of the coordinating areas
When two retailers are symmetric, the analysis above indicates that both allocation methods can coordinate the system. However, we find that when the retailers differ in only one dimension (e.g., all model parameters are the same except the manufacturing costs, c i , or the transshipment costs, X n = X 1 . Thus,ā-set can be considered as a set of parameters in which the transshipment opportunity has no effect on the centralized order decisions. For example, in Figure Proposition 4. Suppose that r 1 = r 2 = r, v 1 = v 2 = v, and F 1 = F 2 = F .
(i) If t 12 = t 21 = t, while c i = c + ∆ and c j = c − ∆ for some c, then DA coordinate the system if and only if |∆| = 0, while TP can achieve a first-best outcome when 0 ≤ |∆| ≤ ∆ t for some
(ii) If c 1 = c 2 = c, while t ij = t + ∆ and t ji = t − ∆ for some t, then DA coordinate the system if and only if |∆| = 0, while TP can achieve a first-best outcome when 0 ≤ |∆| ≤ ∆ t for some
Proposition 4 shows that coordinating TP may exist when the retailers exhibit a certain level of asymmetry. This level of asymmetry is closely related to the impact that transshipment opportunity has on the first-best order decision. For example, when the retailers have parameters in theā-set, the transshipment opportunity has no effect on the first-best order decision, and TP cease to coordinate the system even for a slightest change in the parameter values. belongs to theā-set), the coordinating area consists only of the line t 12 = t 21 (symmetric retailers).
As c moves further away from 8, the coordinating area becomes larger. We also notice that for two costs that are equidistant from 8, e.g., c = 7 and c = 9, the latter yields a wider coordinating area.
This may be due to the fact that the density of triangular distribution T RI(0, √ 3, 2/ √ 3) is not symmetrically shaped. 
Another observation from Proposition 4 is that when the retailers differ in one dimension only, DA cannot achieve a first-best outcome. Although this result has been shown analytically only for manufacturing and transportation costs, our numerical analysis indicates that the statement holds for other parameters as well (see Figures 4 and 5 for additional examples). However, note that this conclusion does not hold when the retailers differ over more than one dimension. Thus, it is not obvious whether TP in general dominate DA (in terms of achieving a first-best outcome). Our next result shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 5. In a two-retailer inventory-sharing game, there may exist instances in which coordinating TP do not exist while DA can achieve a first-best outcome, and vice versa.
Proposition 5 states that for certain parameters TP cannot coordinate the system while DA can. Note that, as illustrated in examples provided in HDK (see, for instance, Figures 1 and 2 in their paper), the areas over which TP coordinate the system may be rather small compared to the area of all feasible TP. A similar conclusion may be derived for the cases in which DA coordinate the system. Thus, we next compare the performance of the two allocation methods over the areas in which they do not induce first-best outcomes.
Comparison of efficiency when the system cannot be coordinated
In this section, we show that (1) there exist nontrivial areas over which DA achieve higher efficiency level than TP; (2) TP yield higher efficiency among retailers that are more "alike", while DA work better between more "asymmetric" retailers.
We start with some numerical illustrations. Consider, for example, Figure We now extend this example by determining the areas over which DA coordinate the system, and by identifying areas over which one allocation method outperforms the other when they do not induce first-best outcomes. This is illustrated in our Figure 5 . While in the graph on the left side TP outperform DA over a large area, the opposite holds for the graph on the right side. Thus, it appears that when the retailers can charge different prices, TP may lead to higher profits, while instances in which the retailers charge equal prices but may differ in their individual costs seem to favor DA. An explanation for this behavior may lie in the fact that the cost difference dominates the price difference in making the retailers more "asymmetric". For example, as the manufacturing 
costs move further apart, it is not hard to verify that a centralized decision maker should decrease (resp., increase) the order quantity for the retailer with higher (resp., lower) cost. However, the characterization of changes in order quantities is less straightforward when the retail prices become different. While a decrease in the value of r i implies lower margin for the items sold by retailer i and thus may be seen as a driver that induces i to decrease her order, an increase in the value of r j implies that i can receive higher value for her unsold items shipped to retailer j, and thus drives her inventory decision in the opposite direction.
Figures 4 and 5 in general imply that DA yield better results with more asymmetric retailers, while TP work better for retailers who are more alike. This may be due to the fact that we calculate TP based on the type of the residuals (supply vs. demand), while DA depend on the size of the residuals (scarce vs. abundant resource).
Suppose, for instance, that (12) is not satisfied. Recall that (16) implies that for any pair of transshipment prices we can find a corresponding pair of fractions,
leading to an equivalent outcome. Note that any feasible pair (γ i , γ j ) impacts the change in order quantities in the same direction. For example, if (i) both γ i and γ j are large (close to one), both retailers receive significantly larger allocation when they possess residual supply than when they have residual demand, which provides an incentive for both retailers to order more than what they would order under X 1 ; (ii) similarly, when both γ i and γ j are small (closer to zero), both retailers prefer to order less than what they would order under X 1 ; (iii) finally, when γ i is large (close to one) while γ j is small (close to zero), retailer i is allocated significantly smaller share than retailer j for both shipments from and shipments to j. It is, then, unlikely that the retailers' order quantities differ significantly from X 1 . Consequently, TP is likely to move both X i and X j in the same direction.
Under DA, the entire residual profit goes to the retailer with fewer residuals, regardless whether they are leftover inventories or unfulfilled demands. Thus, the size of residuals is the dominant factor in determining one's allocation. When the retailers are more asymmetric, it is more likely that at X 1 one of them, say i, supplies leftover inventory, while the other, say j, demands it.
Knowing that fewer residuals imply larger allocation, i may want to reduce her order quantity and thus decrease her ex post leftovers, while j may do just the opposite. Thus, unlike TP, which is likely to move both X i and X j in the same direction, DA may increase one retailer's order quantity and simultaneously induce the other retailer to order less.
It can also be observed from Figures 4 and 5 that the range which defines the retailers as being more alike may have very low tolerance in some instances -DA can lead to lower efficiency losses even when the difference between the retailers is rather small, if their asymmetry has a significant impact on the centralized order quantities. We formalize this discussion in our next theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider two symmetric retailers for which (r, c, v) belongs to theā-set. Then, there exist t ∈ (0, c − v) and t ∈ (c − v, r − v) such that DA achieve higher efficiency level than the best pair of TP under following scenarios:
(ii). r j = r, and either
HDK show in their Theorem 3 that when r or c deviates from theā-set, coordinating TP cease to exist. This observation has been used in our result above, which shows that DA may outperform TP in case of such small deviations.
Note that items (i) and (ii) correspond to (b) and (a) in Figure 5 , respectively, in which the singleton point (r, c, v) = (10.2, 8, 5) belongs to theā-set. (i) states that, given c j = c, DA outperform TP when c i is either larger or smaller than c, which is easily observed in Figure 5 (b). However, (ii) indicates that, given r j = r, DA may lead to a performance improvement when the price for retailer i changes in one of the directions (either decreases or increases) 1 . This is illustrated in Figure 5 (a), in which for given r j = 10.2, DA are preferred only when there is an increase in r i (r i = 10.2 + ); a decrease in r i (r i = 10.2 − ) lands in the area in which TP outperforms DA.
As discussed above, a change in c has a more direct impact on the benefits from using DA, and changes in any direction make DA a more desirable allocation rule. On the other hand, it is less straightforward to evaluate the impact of changes in prices (as they influence both the marginal gain and the marginal loss), and DA become a better choice only for one direction of changes in retail prices. We next provide a further characterization of the areas in which one method dominates the other.
Proposition 6. Given r, c, v, t, and F , suppose that the two retailers have the same parameters except that (i) their manufacturing costs are c i = c + ∆ and c j = c − ∆, or
(ii) their transportation costs are t ij = t + ∆ and t ji = t − ∆.
Then, for each scenario there exists ∆ * ∈ [∆ t , t/2] such that the best pair of TP is no less efficient than DA when 0 ≤ |∆| ≤ ∆ * , and DA is more efficient when ∆ = ∆ * + . In addition, ∆ * = ∆ t if and only if (r, c, v) are in theā-set.
As we discussed above, when the costs deviate slightly from their symmetric values (∆ ≤ ∆ t ), TP continue to coordinate the system, while DA immediately cease to do so. As the deviation increases (∆ > ∆ t ), TP outperform DA until a boundary value, ∆ * , is reached (the retailers are more alike), after which DA leads to higher system efficiencies (the retailers are more asymmetric).
Which of the two allocation methods is better? Although Proposition 5 indicates that in a model with two retailers there are instances in which one of the two allocation methods induces a first-best outcome while the other one does not, numerical analysis indicates that TP seem to be able to induce coordination over a somewhat larger range of parameters than DA. Still, there is a potentially large set of parameters over which neither of the two allocation methods coordinates the system, and for this set we identify some conditions (Theorem 4 and Proposition 6) under which one method outperforms the other. These results, along with our numerical examples, indicate that the area over which DA outperform TP may be larger when the retailers differ in their costs and charge equal prices, while different retail prices seem to favor the use of TP. For example, if (r, c, v) ∈ā-set, DA will outperform TP for all values t for which t ij = t ji . Therefore, the choice of the allocation method depends on a particular problem under consideration and its parameters.
How high are the efficiency losses when a first-best outcome cannot be achieved and one method is selected over the other? Consider again the example depicted in Figure 5 We denote by ρ T P the efficiency (compared to the system-optimal solution) for TP, by ρ DA the efficiency for DA, and we let ρ DA − ρ T P be the efficiency loss realized when DA outperforms TP. It can be verified that ρ DA − ρ T P is maximized when ( 2 , belong to theā-set.
However, our numerical analysis indicates that the difference in efficiency between the two allocation methods is not that significant, especially when compared with the efficiency loss observed when TP is compared to the first-best solution. For the example discussed above, the highest efficiency loss when TP is compared to DA was 1.1%, and it was achieved for the case described in Figure   5 (b); the loss between TP and the system-optimal solution for the same example, on the other hand, can go up to 5.4% (see Figure 6 in HDK).
Note that the demand distribution used in (C) when c or r is fixed and (r, c, v) ∈ā-set, symmetric demand distribution (withā = 0.5) leads to highest efficiency losses among triangular demand distributions defined on the same domain.
In order to quantify the highest possible efficiency loss for our example, we next examine a set of parameters that satisfies all three above-mentioned criteria, (A), (B) and (C). Suppose that demand follows a symmetrical triangular distribution with parameters T RI(0, √ 3, √ 3/2), which impliesā = 0.5. Thus, theā-set contains values (r, v, c) such that r−c r−v = 0.5. We let the retail prices r vary over a large range, r ∈ [10, 200], while the salvage value is fixed at v = 5; the manufacturing costs is then determined by c = (r + v)/2 (to keep q =ā = 0.5). We consider several possible values for transshipment costs, and express them as fractions of the manufacturing costs (e.g., t = 15%c).
Clearly, as t becomes a larger fraction of c, the feasible regions in both Figure 5 (a) and (b) (that is, r j ≥ r i − t ji , c j ≥ c i − t ji ) become wider, and one may expect to see higher efficiency losses. Our analysis shows that this intuition holds for the retailers that differ in their manufacturing costs, but not for those that differ in their retail prices. However, as can be seen from the table below, these efficiency losses are not very significant -when the retailers differ only in their manufacturing costs, the maximum loss in the extreme case with high shipping cost does not exceed 3%, while when the retailers differ only in their retail prices, the loss is even lower. (r i , r j ) = (r + 0.9t/2, r − 0.9t/2) 2.19 2 1.64 1.26 Table 1 : Maximum Efficiency Loss (%) ρ
As there seem to be very little difference in expected profits when either of the two methods is used, one can argue that TP have the advantage of being set once and for all, while DA have to be calculated for every demand realization. Note that in the case with only two retailers we do not need to actually calculate dual prices -the retailer, i, with lower residuals receives p ij (if
for every unit transshipped -hence the model is very simple. However, as mentioned in RKP, with TP "The extension of this analysis to more than two locations is less than straightforward." On the other hand, the appeal of the DA lies in the fact that this allocation rule belongs to the core, and that dual prices can be easily obtained as a "secondary" outcome when the LP is solved in order to determine optimal transshipment patterns, so they are easily extended to an arbitrary number of retailers.
Expected Dual Prices vs. Transshipment Prices
In §6, we will develop heuristics for TP in a model with an arbitrary number of retailers. As a first step towards achieving that goal, we first link expected dual prices with transhipment prices in the model with two retailers, and then use this relationship to analyze heuristics for a possible extension of TP to the case with n symmetric retailers.
Denote by Λ i and M i expected dual prices for retailer i. With only two retailers, λ i = p ij when 0 <H i <Ē j and zero otherwise, while µ i = p ji when 0 <Ē i <H j and zero otherwise. Thus,
and let Λ n i = Λ i (X n 1 , X n 2 ), M n i = M i (X n 1 , X n 2 ). If we observe that (13) implies
we can see that when demands are continuous random variables, then
We now provide some relationships between the TP and the expected dual prices.
Proposition 7. Suppose that both demands are continuous random variables.
1. When the retailers are symmetric or p 12 F 1 (X n 1 )F 2 (X n 2 ) = p 21F1 (X n 1 )F 2 (X n 2 ), there is a oneto-one correspondence between the coordinating TP and the expected value of the dual prices,
Recall that (1 − γ j ) denotes the fraction of unit profit (p ij ) received by retailer j for every unit shipped from retailer i, while γ i denotes the fraction of unit profit (p ji ) received by retailer j for every unit shipped to retailer i. In addition, one can evaluate that
Thus, the left-hand side in (19) corresponds to the ratio of the inbound and the outbound fractions of unit profits from transshipment (as part of coordinating prices) of retailer j, while the right-hand side represents the ratio of the expected margin generated by the residual demand and the expected margin generated by the residual inventory for retailer i. As a result, if retailer i has a higher expected margin generated by her residual demand then by her residual inventory, then retailer j receives higher fraction of unit profit for units shipped from retailer i than for the units shipped to retailer i.
We also note that M n i + Λ n j = p ji , hence
This relationship will be used in the next section, when we develop heuristics for TP among n symmetric cooperating retailers.
Heuristics for TP in a Model with n Retailers
As noted by RKP, the extension of the model using TP to an arbitrary number of retailers is a non-trivial task. First of all, calculation of TP with even as few as three retailers is a demanding process, because all possible relationships among residuals need to be taken into account. Even if one manages to calculate the exact TP, the next challenge is an appropriate matching of residual supply and residual demand. A retailer with unmet demand, say i, prefers to obtain inventory from a retailer who charges the lowest transshipment price, say j = arg min l {τ li }, while retailer j may prefer to send her inventory to a retailer from whom she can obtain higher unit profit, say k = arg max l {τ jl }. Thus, one would need to develop an appropriate rule for allocation of inventory among retailers.
In this part of our analysis, we aim to provide some insights into the model with n retailers. In an attempt to overcome the above-mentioned challenges, we first concentrate on the model with n ≥ 2 symmetric retailers who face i.i.d. demands. Even with this simplification, we are not able to calculate the exact value of TP; we propose five heuristics and explore their behavior for different values of the critical fractile. We then turn our attention to the model with asymmetric retailers.
Due to complexity of this setting, we assume that transshipments do not go directly from retailer i to retailer j, but the retailers instead use a central depot that allocates the inventory among them. We believe that this is a reasonable assumption, as the retailers may not be able to use the transshipment option in such a complicated system without a central coordinator.
Model with n Symmetric Retailers
Suppose first that n retailers face i.i.d. demands, incur identical costs, and charge identical prices.
We first consider DA; in this case, each retailer with residual supply (demand) has dual price of p if total residual demand (supply) exceeds total residual supply (demand), and zero otherwise. We extend the definition of a i and b i for the model with two retailers from Section 4 as follows: denote
and let
where all probabilities are evaluated at X = X n . Thus, if we consider the cases in which i is able to use all of her residuals, α i expands the definition of a i and denotes the probability that retailer i has unsatisfied demand and total supply exceeds total demand (hence, all demand of retailer i will be met), while β i expands the definition of b i and denotes the probability that retailer i has leftover inventory and total demand exceeds total supply (hence, retailer i will ship all of her inventory); when i is not able to use all of her residuals,α i expands the definition of a i and denotes the probability that total residuals of retailers other than i result in unsatisfied demand and total supply exceeds total demand (hence, retailer i may be left with some unused inventory), whileβ i expands the definition of b i and denotes the probability that total residuals of retailers other than i result in leftover inventory and total demand exceeds total supply (hence, retailer i may be left with some unsatisfied demand). Because all retailers are symmetric, we let
Now, we consider TP. If the retailers are symmetric, they will charge the same TP in an equilibrium. Note that in the case n = 2 with symmetric retailers, equation (16) (11), we let
We propose several possible heuristics for determining TP among n retailers by considering different values for ω. We select ω's that in some way preserve the relationship between TP and expected dual prices described by (19); in our analysis, we take into account relationship between expected dual prices described by (20). Table 2 shows the values for ω, γ, and 1 − γ for four different heuristics; as it can be seen from the table, the ratio (1 − γ)/γ in all cases preserves the flavor of the relationship described by (19) and (20) for the case with two retailers.
Next, we have to formalize how are residual surpluses matched with residual demands in our model. Suppose that heuristic TP are calculated by using γ k , and that a retailer with residual supply (demand) meets a fraction of her residuals proportional to her contribution to the total residual supply (demand). Then, for any retailer i, her total profit under demand realization D is given by
. The first line in the equation
represents the non-cooperative profit generated by the local demand at i, while the second line represents the additional profit from transshipments. IfĒ i > 0 andĒ <H, entire residual demand at i will be met by other retailers' residual supplies, and retailer i receives a fraction 1 − γ k of the residual profits from these transshipments, pĒ i . On the other hand, ifĒ i > 0 andĒ >H, we assume that unsatisfied demands at each retailer are met proportionally, henceĒ iH E units are shipped to retailer i and a fraction 1 − γ k of the resulting profits is allocated to i, pĒ iH /Ē. A similar analysis applies to the case in whichH i > 0. This proportional rule possesses a "fairness" flavor, by rewarding the retailers proportionally to their contribution, while it still preserves enough generality -because the retailers are symmetric, this allocation yields the same expected profit for each retailer as the allocation in which they split the residual demand (resp., supply) evenly when E >H (resp.,H >Ē).
Numerical comparisons -order quantities
While first-best order quantity, X n , and the corresponding expected profit can be found easily from the FOC for the total expected profit, the equilibrium order quantity under any specific heuristic is more difficult to determine. To that extent, we approximate these quantities through numerical simulations. Because the retailers are symmetric, each of them orders the same amount in an NE of the game with transshipments: X t j = X t ∀j. Thus, X t is a NE for a retailer, i, if it is optimal for retailer i to order X t when other retailers do the same. Our goal in the next set of experiments is to characterize the differences between X t and X n , the system-optimal order quantity, and the corresponding differences in profits.
For a group of n retailers, where n = 2, 3, ..., 10, we generate 5000 sets of demand realizations under the same assumptions that we used before (that is, the retailers are symmetric with i.i.d demands following a normal distribution with mean value of 100 and σ = 10, and r = 10, v = 1, t = 2). Assume that all retailers other than i order at some level X 0 ; then, an optimal order level for retailer i, X i (X 0 ), can be determined by maximizing the approximation of the "expected profit", D P i (X, D)/5000. The equilibrium under heuristic TP can be characterized by X i (X t ) = X t . Figure 6 shows the difference between X t and X n for different heuristic TP as a function of the number of retailers. As illustrated in Figure 6 , the differences between system-optimal decisions and order quantities for different heuristics depends strongly on the value of the critical fractile. In the extreme cases (large or small q), it is less likely that there will be any transshipments because all retailers have either a lot of inventory or very small amounts of it, and TP that induces orders closer to the first-best outcome take into account both inventory at an individual retailer and at the remaining n − 1 retailers. Thus, when the critical fractile is small (hence, the retailers' order quantities are small), it is more likely that the retailers will need additional inventory from their partners, and the heuristics with orders close to the system-optimal quantities is the one which takes into account the probability that a retailer has residual demand while the remaining retailers are left with residual surplus (γ 2 , which corresponds toΛ n ); when the critical fractile is large (hence, the retailers' order quantities are large), it is more likely that the retailers will benefit only if they need to ship additional inventory to their partners, and the heuristics with orders close to the system-optimal quantities is the one which takes into account the probability that a retailer has residual inventory while the remaining retailers are left with residual demand (γ 3 , which corresponds to p −M n ). When critical fractiles are closer to 0.5, it is more likely that there will be inventory transshipments, and the heuristics with orders close to the system-optimal quantities are the ones that concentrate either on individual retailer, or on the all of remaining retailers. When q ≤ 0.5
(but close to it), the retailers order slightly less than their mean demand, and better results are obtained if the TP consider probabilities that a particular retailer, i, uses all of her residuals (γ 4 , which uses α and β). On the other hand, when q ≥ 0.5 (but close to it), the retailers order slightly more than their mean demand, and better results are obtained if the TP consider probabilities that the retailers other than i use all of their residuals (γ 1 , which usesα andβ).
Numerical comparisons -expected profits
We also compare the expected profits attained under different heuristics with the system-optimal values. The efficiency losses are depicted in Figure 7 . As can be expected, heuristics that induce order quantities closer to the system-optimal ones lead to lower efficiency losses. It is interesting to note that γ 5 , which simply uses TP for n = 2 and is easy to calculate, may outperform other heuristics and leads to very small efficiency losses when q is close to 0.5. Furthermore, when critical fractile is high, all heuristics perform rather well (e.g., for q = 0.9, the efficiency losses are below 0.2% regardless of the heuristics used). Thus, it appears that γ 5 is a reasonable choice for high and medium values of the critical fractile; on the other hand, when critical fractile is low (closer to zero), the best results are obtained by using heuristics γ 2 .
Transshipment Among n Asymmetric Retailers
As mentioned above, calculating an appropriate TP among arbitrary many retailers can be very challenging; introducing asymmetry among the retailers makes the problem even more demanding. In an attempt to simplify the task on hand, we introduce a central depot (which may be, for instance, the manufacturer) that manages the transshipment of residuals. Thus, instead of direct transshipments between any two retailers, leftover supplies used in inventory sharing are first shipped to this depot, and then to the retailers with unfulfilled demand. Consequently, we do not need to establish transshipment prices for all pairs of retailers; it is the transshipment prices between each retailer and the central depot that matter. We denote the central depot by subscript 0; then, t i0 (resp., t 0i ) is the transshipment costs to ship one unit of product from retailer i (resp., the central depot) to the central depot (resp., retailer i). We also use t ij to denote the sum t i0 + t 0j , which is the total transshipment cost incurred if the central depot decides to purchase one unit of leftover inventory from retailer i and ship it to retailer j.
For each retailer-depot pair, we assume there is an ex-ante TP agreement; that is, for every unit shipped from retailer i (resp., to retailer j), the depot pays (resp., charges) the retailer an amount equal to τ i0 (resp., τ 0j ), and the depot is responsible for the transshipment cost t i0 (resp., t 0j ). Hence, a retailer's profit is τ i0 − v i (resp., r j − τ 0j ), while the depot's net income is −τ i0 − t i0 (resp., τ 0j − t 0j ).
The central depot, however, is not required to purchase all of the leftover inventories or to meet the entire unmet demand; it will match two retailers, say i and j, for a unit of product if this decision is not detrimental to the depot. For example, if the depot purchases one unit of leftover inventory from retailer i and sells it to retailer j (who has some extra demand), the depot's margin is τ 0j − t 0j − τ i0 − t i0 = τ 0j − τ i0 − t ij . Clearly, the depot would consider this transaction only if τ 0j − τ i0 ≥ t ij ; we denote this condition by (ID), the incentive for the depot.
Similarly, retailer i would agree to ship her leftover inventory to the depot if and only if τ i0 −v i ≥ 0, while retailer j wants to purchase from the depot if r j − τ 0j ≥ 0. We denote these conditions by (IRS) and (IRB), the incentives for the retailers to sell and the incentives for the retailers to buy, respectively. A TP agreement is feasible if and only if all three sets of conditions -(ID), (IRS), and (IRB) -are satisfied.
We say that the central depot is neutral under given TP if it receives a zero-profit allocation for each match between any two retailers and if it optimizes the system's profit ex post. We propose a TP agreement between the depot and each retailer as follows.
Proposition 8. Let v m + t m0 = max i {v i + t i0 }, and define a TP agreement by
This TP agreement makes the central depot neutral and satisfies (ID), (IRS), and (IRB).
Proof. For TP defined by (23) and (24), it is easy to verify that (ID) holds:
In addition,
We refer to the mechanism described in Proposition 8 as TPND (transshipment prices with a neutral depot). Under TPND, all the retailers and the depot are willing to participate, and all the profits from inventory sharing are allocated among the n retailers; the central depot serves as a neutral coordinator that optimizes the ex-post transshipment pattern. The optimal transshipment pattern can be obtained by arranging the retailers into sequences h(·) and e(·) such that r e(i) − t 0e(i) ≥ r e(j) − t 0e(j) ∀i, j s.t. e(i) < e(j);
Intuitively, e(·) orders the retailers according to "best places to sell to" (a retailer with a smaller index e(·) generates higher margin per unit shipped from the depot), while h(·) orders the retailers according to "best places to buy from" (a retailer with a smaller index h(·) costs less per unit shipped to the depot). The task of the depot is: (1) to identify the amount of residuals that can be matched, Q = min{ H i , Ē i }; (2) to buy Q units from the retailers with the lowest ranks in the sequence h(·); and (3) to sell them to the retailers with the lowest ranks in the sequence e(·).
Clearly, it is easy to calculate the transshipment prices and order the retailers, so the method is easy to implement.
Notice that there may exist different TP agreements with a neutral depot that also satisfy (ID), (IRS), and (IRB). However, TPND from Proposition 8 is easy to calculate and guaranteed to work in general conditions.
Numerical Comparisons
We next perform extensive simulations to examine the efficiency levels under different models and allocation rules. We denote by ρ T P N D the efficiency (compared to the system-optimal solution) for TPND proposed in Proposition 8, by ρ DA the efficiency for DA, and by ρ 1 the efficiency for the basic newsvendor model without transshipment (BNM). We consider a three-retailer game in which the base parameters are r = 10, v = 4, t i0 = t 0i = 1, and c ∈ {6, 8}. We assume that demands
, where δ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The parameter values for the three retailers are given by triplets (e.g., r = (r, r, r) or t i0 = t 0i = (t i0 , t i0 , t i0 )). We vary one parameter at a time and analyze how ρ T P N D , ρ DA , and ρ 1 change with demand variance (δ), critical fractile (q = 2/3 when c = 6 and q = 1/3 when c = 8), and the degree of asymmetry (the difference in the extreme parameter values -e.g.,r − r ort i0 − t i0 ). For computational ease, we assume that demand can attain only integer values, and look only at integer solutions. While this assumption causes some minor irregularities in the simulation outcomes, the general trends obtained from our computations provide some interesting insights.
Due to space constraints, we omit our detailed numerical results (they can be obtained from the authors), and summarize our findings. Both TPND and DA significantly improve the total system profit when compared with BNM. In particular, ρ T P N D − ρ 1 , the improvement that TPND has over the BNM, ranges between 9% and 12% when q = 1/3, and between 5% and 7% when q = 2/3. Additionally, TPND is in general outperformed by DA, which means that the transshipment opportunity can increase the efficiency even more. The difference ρ DA − ρ T P N D is between 2% and 5% when q = 1/3, while it falls below 1% when q = 2/3.
We next analyze the impact that different model parameters have on the efficiency gaps.
• Critical Fractile. Throughout the simulations, a higher critical fractile resulted in lower efficiency losses, regardless of the levels of the other parameters (demand variance or asymmetry levels stemming from parameter ranges) and allocation rules -TPND, DA, or BNM. In addition, a higher critical fractile reduces the difference in efficiency between different allocation methods (ρ T P N D −ρ 1 and ρ DA −ρ T P N D ). Thus, our analysis suggests that transshipment opportunity is more beneficial for models with lower critical fractiles, and that higher critical fractile makes the choice between DA and TPND less significant.
• Demand Variance. For all three allocation rules (TPND, DA, or BNM), efficiency levels decrease when demand variance, δ, increases. However, the efficiency gaps between different allocation methods, ρ T P N D − ρ 1 and ρ DA − ρ T P N D , generally increase with δ. This suggests that the benefits from using the transshipment opportunity, as well as the dominance of DA over TPND, is more significant in presence of higher uncertainty.
• Degree of Asymmetry. The degree of asymmetry -or, in other words, the differences in extreme parameter values -may have very different impact on the outcomes. We discuss each of them individually:
(a) Retail prices, r, or manufacturing costs, c. The efficiency of all three allocation methods, (b) Salvage Value, v, or Transshipment Costs, t i0 and t 0i . While ρ 1 decreases as the retailers become more asymmetric, ρ T P N D either increases or does not exhibit significant changes (varying less than 1%). While one may expect to see a decrease in efficiency when faced with larger parameter differences, an intuitive explanation for the opposite phenomenon that occurs with ρ T P N D is that the parameters v, t i0 and t 0i have been incorporated in TPND. Hence, the effect of asymmetry in these parameters is partially hedged off by our allocation mechanism, and ρ T P N D − ρ 1 increases with higher asymmetry. On the other hand, we do not see significant changes in ρ DA , hence ρ DA − ρ T P N D is more likely to decrease. Our analysis suggests that asymmetry in v and t i0 reeduces the benefits from using DA over TPND.
(c) Demand Variance, δ. The efficiency of all three allocation methods, ρ 1 , ρ T P N D and ρ DA , increases when the parameters move further apart. We note that this result may be due to our assumption thatδ + δ = 2δ, hence a possible decrease in sales at one retailer may be more than matched by the increase in sales at the other retailer. Thus, one may prefer the use of DA when the critical fractile is low, while TPND may be a more implementable choice when the critical fractile is high.
In summary, the opportunity for transshipments of residuals appears to be more beneficial when the critical fractile is low, or when the demand variance is high. In our simulations, DA is generally more efficient than TPND, especially when the retailers differ in their retail prices or their manufacturing costs. However, TPND can be a great alternative because of its easy implementation when (1) the retailers face similar retail prices and manufacturing costs, but differ in their salvage values or transshipment costs, (2) the critical fractiles are high, or (3) the demand variances are low.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study newsvendor games in which residual inventories can be transshipped among the retailers and the resulting profit is distributed among the retailers according to an mutually agreed upon allocation rule (DA or TP). Despite the fact that DA have already been used in this context, the existence of the NE for these games has not been established. Although the profit functions are discontinuous, we obtain sufficient conditions for the existence of the NE in both pure and mixed strategies.
We then compare DA with TP in the model with two retailers. Our analysis indicates that neither of these two methods clearly dominates another -there are instances in which one method can coordinate the system, while the other cannot. We also identify some parameter ranges over which one method outperforms the other when neither of them yields a system-optimal outcome.
According to our results, the system is more likely to benefit from TP when the retailers differ only in retail prices, while DA may be a better option when the retailers differ only in their costs. In addition, we note that TP may yield higher profits when retailers are in general "more alike" and DA may be more efficient when the retailers are "more asymmetric".
We also link expected dual prices to TP in the model with two retailers, and use the relationships derived in this setting to develop heuristics for TP in a model with arbitrary many symmetric retailers. Each of the proposed heuristics outperforms the others over a given range of values of the critical fractile. However, the naive heuristics that simply uses TP calculated for n = 2 performs rather well, as long as the critical fractile is reasonably far from zero.
To extend the transshipment problem to a more general setting, we propose a model in which asymmetric retailers use a central depot to coordinate transshipments and derive a mechanism (TPND) under which the depot maximizes the residual profit and allocates its entire value among the retailers. Both DA and TPND significantly improve the system's profit when compared to the model with no transshipments. Although DA generally dominates TPND in our numerical simulations, we identify several instances under which TPND can serve as a good alternative to DA due to ease of its implementation (e.g., when retailers differ in salvage value or transshipment costs only, when the critical fractiles are low, or when demand variances are low).
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider, for instance, the symmetric model with n = 2, r = 9, c = 6, v = 1, and t = 4. Suppose that there is a discontinuity at pointX. Without loss of generality, suppose that retailer 1 has residual supply and retailer 2 has residual demand. Figure At pointX, we have multiple dual solutions, and we would need to decide what values to pick in order to completely define P d i . As shown in Figure A1 , upper semicontinuity of the profit function for retailer 1 would require that atX we have λ 1 = 4, while at the same time upper semicontinuity of the profit function for retailer 2 would require that atX we have µ 2 = 4. As one case rules out the other, we cannot achieve upper semicontinuity of the profit functions, regardless of the rule used to deal with degenerate cases. Now, if we consider an arbitrary case with n retailers, transshipments occur only if there is at least one retailer with residual supply and one retailer with residual demand. Let X be a point in which the payoff for a retailer with residual supply, say s, has a discontinuity; that is, λ s changes to λ s , with λ s < λ s . Then, there is a retailer with residual demand, say d, with a discontinuity at X, such that µ d changes to µ d , with µ d > µ d . Similarly to the analysis shown above, in order to achieve upper semicontinuity of the profit functions we would need that at X dual price for retailer s attains value λ s , and at the same time we would need that dual price for retailer d attains value µ d , which does not give an optimal solution for the dual problem.
Proof of Theorem 1: We first need to introduce some definitions from Reny (1999) . A game, G, is called compact if all pure strategy sets, S i , are nonempty compact subsets of a topological vector space, and if all payoff functions, u i , are bounded. Player i can secure a payoff of γ ∈ IR at s ∈ S if there existss i ∈ S i such that u i (s i , s −i ) ≥ γ for all s −i in some open neighborhood of s −i . A game, G, is better-reply secure if whenever (s * , u * ) is in the closure of the graph of its payoff function and s * is not a NE, some player i can secure a payoff strictly above u * i at s * . So, a game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy s * and payoff vector u * resulting from strategies approaching s * , a player, i, has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u * i even if the others deviate slightly from s * . The main result from Reny (1999) states that if G is compact, quasiconcave, and better-reply secure, then it possesses a pure strategy NE. We want to apply this result to our game.
Proposition 1 implies that each retailer's expected profit function in our inventory-sharing game is unimodal when p = p ij , ∀i, j or p ij ≤ min{c i − v i , r j − c j } for all i = j. To show that a game is better-reply secure, it is enough to show (Proposition 3.2 in Reny) that the game is (i) reciprocally upper semicontinuous and (ii) payoff secure.
(i) Reciprocal upper semicontinuity requires that some players payoff jump up whenever some other players payoff jumps down. This is a generalization of the condition from Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , which requires that the sum of all expected profit functions is upper semicontinuous, and which is satisfied for our game.
(ii) Payoff security requires that for every strategy s and every ε > 0, each player i can secure a payoff of u i (s) − ε at s. In other words, payoff security requires that for every strategy s, each player has a strategy that virtually guarantees the payoff he receives at s, even if the others deviate slightly from s. Consider a non-equilibrium point, X, for our inventory-sharing game, and select a retailer, i. If i's expected profit is continuous in X, it is easy to see that the condition for payoff security is satisfied. Now, suppose that i's expected payoff has a discontinuity at X. Then, if i's expected payoff has a jump up (resp., down) at X, he can secure a payoff that is at worst just below the status quo by increasing (resp., decreasing) her order quantity slightly. Consequently, inventory-sharing game is payoff secure. As (i) also shows its reciprocal upper semicontinuity, the inventory-sharing game is better-reply secure, and it possesses a pure strategy NE.
Proof of Theorem 2: Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) states that our game will have a NE in mixed strategies if the sum of all expected profit functions is upper semicontinuous, and if the expected profit for a retailer, i, is bounded and weakly lower semicontinuous. It is easy to verify that these conditions are satisfied in our case: the sum of all expected profits is continuous, and the conditions for weak lower semicontinuity (Definition 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin) is satisfied by letting λ = 0 or λ = 1.
Proof or Proposition 3:
If the retailers are symmetric, then there is an equilibrium in which all retailers order the same quantity,
If we consider the centralized system, there is an equilibrium in which all retailers order the same quantity, X n i = X n , ∀i. Because centralized model maximizes the expected profit,
, and (6) implies that it is optimal for symmetric retailers to order at the first-best level, X d = X n .
Proof of Proposition 4:
Without loss of generality, assume ∆ > 0 such that c 1 = c + ∆ > c 2 = c − ∆ for (i) and t 12 = t + ∆ > t 21 = t − ∆ for (ii). LetF (·) be the c.d.f. of the total demand,
, with the corresponding densityf (·), and let X be the total order quantity, X 1 + X 2 .
For our proof, we need the following result, which for brevity we state without the proof (it can be obtained from the authors).
Lemma A1. X n 1 decreases with ∆, and X n 2 increases with ∆.
We now continue the proof of the proposition.
(i) For DA, the sufficient and necessary condition for a first-best outcome is G 1 = G 2 at X n . As p 12 = p 21 = r−v−t, the condition is equivalent to (g 1 = g 2 ) | X n . However, Lemma A1 indicates that X n 1 < X n 2 , hence (g 1 = g 2 ) | X n and DA cannot coordinate the system when |∆| > 0. For TP, with the given r and v, we can find ac such that (r,c, v) is in theā-set. LetX n be the system-optimal order quantity for parameters (r,c, v) 
It can also be verified that if c 1 = c 2 >c, then the first-best order quantity, X n i , satisfies X n i <X n i , and
∆ the system-optimal order quantity for parameters (r,c, v) and (r;c + ∆,c − ∆; v), respectively. Suppose that c >c such that X n i <X n i and
. Let ∆ t = sup{∆ : a 1 (X n ∆ ) − b 1 (X n ∆ ) ≤ 0}. Then, the TP coordinate the system whenever ∆ ≤ ∆ t (which implies (A 1 − B 1 )(A 2 − B 2 ) ≥ 0).
A similar analysis holds for c <c.
(ii) t 12 = t + ∆ > t 21 = t − ∆ implies p 12 < p 21 , and Lemma A1 implies X n 2 > X n 1 . For DA, this means
Consequently, G 1 = p 21 g 1 (X n ) > G 2 = p 12 g 2 (X n ), and DA cannot coordinate the system. The proof for TP follows similar steps as described in (i).
(iii) When (r, c, v) is not in theā-set and ∆ = 0, we have |A i − B i | > 0 for t ∈ (0, r − v). Thus, there exists some > 0 such that the signs of A i −B i remains unchanged when ∆ ≤ . Now, suppose that (r, c, v) is in theā-set. Then, at ∆ = 0 ,we have a 1 (X n ) − b 1 (X n ) = a 2 (X n ) − b 2 (X n ) = 0 and f 1 (X n 1 ) = f 2 (X n 2 ). Suppose that c 1 = c + ∆ > c 2 = c − ∆; similarly as before, this implies that
Consequently, (A 1 − B 1 )(A 2 − B 2 ) = p 2 (a 1 (X n ∆ ) − b 1 (X n ∆ ))(a 2 (X n ∆ ) − b 2 (X n ∆ )) < 0, hence ∆ t = 0. A similar analysis holds for t 12 = t + ∆ > t 21 = t − ∆.
Proof of Proposition 5:
To show there are instances in which DA coordinates while TP cannot, let us first consider an example with two retailers who have the parameters described in Table   A1 . verified that at X 1 = 0.48 and X 2 = 0.52, A 1 (X 1 , X 2 ) = B 2 (X 1 , X 2 ) = 0.9235,, A 2 (X 1 , X 2 ) = B 1 (X 1 , X 2 ) = 0.9384, and G 1 (X 1 , X 2 ) = G 2 (X 1 , X 2 ) = 0.6984, and the FOC's are zero, r i − c i − (r i − v i )F (X i ) + B i (X 1 , X 2 ) − A i (X 1 , X 2 ) = 0, hence (X 1 , X 2 ) is the first-best order quantity, and 2 . We first prove the following lemma that is used in our proof.
2 When m = n, we let J n 1 = J n 2 = J n .
Lemma A2. Given any π > 0, X (π) = { (x 1 , x 2 ) | J n (x 1 , x 2 ) >= π } is a convex set.
Proof. To show this statement, it is enough to prove that the Hessian matrix of J n (X 1 , X 2 ) is negative semi-definite. It can be verified that (J n ) ij = −p ij X i 0 f j (X 1 + X 2 − u)dF i (u) − p ji X j 0 f i (X 1 + X 2 − u)dF j (u) < 0; (J n ) ii = (J n ) ij − (r i − v i )f i (X i ) + p ijFj (X j )f i (X i ) + p ji F j (X j )f i (X i ) = (J n ) ij − (r i − v i − p ijFj (X j ) − p ji F j (X j ))f i (X i ) ≤ − min{t ij + r i − r j , t ji + v j − v i }f i (X i ) + (J n ) ij .
To avoid trivial cases, we assume t ij + r i ≥ r j and t ji + v j ≥ v i as mentioned in §2. Thus (J n ) ii ≤ (J n ) ij < 0, which also implies that (J n ) 11 (J n ) 22 − (J n ) 12 (J n ) 21 ≥ 0. Hence, the matrix is negative semi-definite and X (π) is a convex set.
We now continue the proof of the theorem.
(i) Without loss of generality, assume c 1 = c + > c 2 = c. It can be verified that this implies X n 1 < X 1 1 < X 1 2 =X < X n 2 , so coordinating TP do not exists because neither X n ≤ X 1 nor X n ≥ X 1 holds. Moreover, X n 1 + X n 2 < 2X. We proceed by identifying the best pair of TP, (γ 1 ,γ 2 ), which provides the highest efficiency among all non-negative (γ 1 , γ 2 ). It can be shown (the proof is omitted due to space constraints) that when c 1 = c + > c 2 = c, the best pair of non-negative TP is either (1, 0) or (0, 1). Assume the best pair of TP is achieved by letting . We next prove that π d > π t :
(1) We first show that X n 1 − X n 2 > X d 1 − X d 2 ≥ X t 1 − X t 2 : For any J m , we have Table A2 summarizes the values of these expressions at c 1 = c, with L = tf (X) and K = Hence expression X n 1 − X n 2 > X d 1 − X d 2 ≥ X t 1 − X t 2 holds. (2) We now show that X t is not an interior point of X (π d ). On the contour of J n (X) = π d , we
By Lemma A2 and the first inequality in (1) (X n 2 − X n 1 > X d 2 − X d 1 ), any X which is an interior point of X (π d ) should satisfy X 2 − X 1 > X d 2 − X d 1 . However, (1) implies that this does not hold for X t . Thus, π d ≥ π t .
(ii) When r 2 = r+ > r 1 = r, assume without loss of generality t ∈ [0, τ ], with τ ∈ (c−v, r−v) defined in Theorem 1 of HDK (2007). We first look at the case when (γ 1 ,γ 2 ) = (1, 0); following an analysis similar to the one that we used in the proof of (i), it is then enough to show that 
The rest of the proof follows the steps from part (2) of (i). Table A3 summarizes the values of the expressions for different derivatives. 
